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Using the work – leisure choice model, this paper computes equilibrium 
hours-worked for a number of Arab, non-oil-producing and labor-abundant countries 
and major oil-producing, tax-free and labor-scarce countries, for which actual data are 
unavailable.  We estimate hours-worked for the G7, and show that the model fits the 
data well.  We use this evidence as a yardstick to evaluate the model for the Arab 
countries for which no actual data are available.  The model explains hours-worked in 
Arab, non-oil-producing countries well, but it fails to explain hours-worked in the oil-
producing – tax-free countries.  With the effective marginal tax rate close to zero, 
hours-worked increase significantly.  We show that natural resource endowment is a 
required predicting factor for the model in this case.  It turned out that natural 
resource capital acts exactly as a tax. In other words, it increases the wedge between 
real wages and marginal productivity, hence, natural resource wedge.  The higher the 
natural resource endowment the less hours people worked.  Most importantly, we 
provide a wider support to the model and confirm that the labor supply is elastic in all 
Arab countries. This finding confirms previous research that workers respond to 
incentives, which has serious implications for tax and social security policies.  We 
also provide some policy simulation pertinent to poverty and welfare. 
 
ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺽﺮﻋﻭ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻄﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ،ﺐﺋﺍﺮﻀﻟﺍ  
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ 
 ﺔﻟﺎﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺫ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺩﺪﻋ ﰲ ﻞﻣﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺩﺮﻔﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﻋﻮﺒﺳﻷﺍ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﺎﺳ ﺩﺪﻋ ﺏﺎﺴﲝ ﻡﻮﻘ￿ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﰲ
ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﲑﻏﻭ ﺔﺤﻴﺤﺸﻟﺍ ﺹﻮﺼﳋﺍ ﺍﺬﲠ ﺕﺎ￿ﺎﻴﺑ ﺎﻬﻳﺪﻟ ﺮﻓﻮﺘﺗ ﻻ ﱵﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻀﺋﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺫ   .  ﺔ￿ﺭﺎﻘﲟ ﻡﻮﻘ￿ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺞﺋﺎﺘ￿ ﻢﻴﻴﻘﺗ ﺽﺮﻐﻟﻭ
ﻯﱪﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻌﺒﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻨﺼﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻠﻟ ﺎﻫﺎﻨﺒﺴﺣ ﱵﻟﺍ ﻚﻠﺗ ﻊﻣ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ  .  ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﰲ ﻞﺸﻔﻳ ﻪﻨﻜﻟﻭ ﺔ￿ﺭﺎﻘﳌﺎﺑ ﺔﻟﻮﻘﻌﻣ ﺞﺋﺎﺘ￿ ﺎﻨﻴﻄﻌﻳ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺑ ﺎ￿ﺪﺟﻭ
ﺒﺳ ﻥﺇ ،ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ  ﺩﺪﻋ ﺪﻳﺪﺤﺘﻟ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﰲ ﻲﺳﺎﺳﺃ ﻞﻣﺎﻋ ﻮﻫ ﻲﻠﻌﻔﻟﺍ ﺔﺒﻳﺮﻀﻟﺍ ﻝﺪﻌﻣﻭ ﺐﺋﺍﺮﺿ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﺲﻴﻟ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻥﻮﻛ ﻮﻫ ﻞﺸﻔﻟﺍ ﺐ
ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﺎﺳ  .  ﻪﻴﻠﻋﻭ ﻝﺎﳌﺍ ﺱﺍﺭ ﻦﻣ ﻢﻬﻣ ﺀﺰﺟ ﺎﻫﺭﺎﺒﺘﻋﺎﺑ ﻲﻣﻮﻘﻟﺍ ﺞﺗﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻛ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﻭﺮﺜﻟﺍ ﻝﺎﺧﺩﺈﺑ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺮﻳﻮﺤﺘﺑ ﺎﻨﻤﻗ ﺪﻘﻓ ،ﻪﻴﻠﻋﻭ
ﺝﺎﺘ￿ﻹﺍ ﻯﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﺛﺆﺗ  . ﻭ  ﻖﻠﳜﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﺎﺳ ﺩﺪﻋ ﻞﻴﻠﻘﺗ ﱃﺇ ﻱﺩﺆﻳ ﺎﻬﻋﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺚﻴﺣ ﺔﺒﻳﺮﻀﻟﺍ ﻞﻤﻋ ﻞﻤﻌﺗ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﻭﺮﺜﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺑ ﺎ￿ﺪﺟﻭ
ﺔﻳﺪﳊﺍ ﺔﻴﺟﺎﺘ￿ﺍﻭ ﻲﻘﻴﻘﳊﺍ ﺮﺟﻷﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺓﻮﺠﻓ  . ﺔﻴﻌﻳﺭ ﻝﻭﺩ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻥﺇ  .  ﻞﻌﳚ ﺎﳑ ﻊﻳﺮﻟﺍ ﺩﺍﺩﺰﻳ ﻪﻌﻣﻭ ﺕﺍﺩﺭﺍﻮﻟﺍ ﺩﺍﺩﺰﺗ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺮﻌﺳ ﺩﺍﺩﺰﻳ ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ
 ﻊﻳﺮﻟﺍ ﺀﺍﺭﻭ ﻲﻌﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻮﻠﻀﻔﻳ ﺱﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ .    ﻥﺃ ﺚﻴﺣ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺍﺬﳍ ﻢﻋﺩ ﻡﺪﻘﺗﻭ ًﺎ￿ﺮﻣ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺽﺮﻋ ﺪﲡ ًﺎﻀﻳﺃ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻥﺇ
ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ ﻥﺎﻤﻀﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺳﺎﻴﺳ ًﺎﺻﻮﺼﺧﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﳌﺍ ﺕﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻏﺎﻴﺻ ﻯﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺕﺎﻌﺒﺗ ﺍﺬﳍﻭ ﺰﻓﺍﻮﳊﺎﺑ ﺮﺛﺄﺘﻳ ﻞﻣﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺑ ﺪﻳﺆﺗ ﺔﺠﻴﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ  .
ﺳ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻡﺪﻘﺗ ﺍﺬﻫ ﻞﻛ ﱃﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻩﺎﻓﺮﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺎﻳﺯ ﻝﻮﺣ ﺔﻴ￿ﺎﺜﻟﺍﻭ ﺮﻘﻔﻟﺍ ﻞﻴﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﻴﻔﻴﻛ ﻦﻋ ﱃﻭﻷﺍ ،ﲔﺘﺳﺎﻴ .    ﺏﺮﻐﳌﺍ ﺎ￿ﱰﺧﺍﻭ
 ﻙﺎﻨﻫ ﺚﻴﺣ ﺮﻘﻔﻟﺍ ﻞﻴﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﻴﻔﻴﻛ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺪﻟ %20 ﺮﻘﻔﻟﺍ ﻂﺧ ﺖﲢ ﻥﺎﻜﺴﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ   .  ﺔﺒﻳﺮﻀﻟﺍ ﻝﺪﻌﻣ ﺾﻔﺧ ﱃﺇ ﻰﻌﺴﺗ ﱵﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﳌﺍ ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺑ ﺎﻨﹼﻴﺑﻭ
 ﻦﻣ ﻲﻠﻌﻔﻟﺍ 39  ﱃﺇ  30 ﻟﺍ ﻝﺪﻌﻣ ﺾﻔﺧ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻬﻨﻜﳝ ﺔﺌﳌﺎﺑ   ﻝﻼﺧ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﻮﻫ ﺎﻣ ﻒﺼ￿ ﱃﺇ ﺮﻘﻔ 12 ﺔﻨﺳ   .  ﻥﺈﻓ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻩﺎﻓﺮﻟﺍ ﺹﻮﺼﲞ ﺎﻣﺃ
ﺩﺮﻔﻠﻟ ﻩﺎﻓﺮﻟﺍ ﻝﺪﻌﻣ ﰲ ﺽﺎﻔﳔﺍ ﱃﺇ ﻱﺩﺆﺘﺳ ﺞﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻝﻭﺩ ﰲ ﻙﻼﻬﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺐﺋﺍﺮﺿ ﺙﺍﺪﺤﺘﺳﺍ ﺓﺩﺎﻳﺯ ﺓﺮﻜﻓ .  
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
 
Our primary objective is to provide information about the labor market such as 
hours-worked, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and labor productivity in a number 
of Arab countries.  Without such information the discussions about labor, fiscal, 
social security, welfare and poverty policies, among others, would be misguided.  
 
We focus on the macroeconomic implications of policy issues.  Data limitation 
dictates research methodology.  We calibrate a theoretical model, namely, the  work – 
leisure choice model, which Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004) and Shimer (2009) 
demonstrated its goodness of fit to G7 data.
1 This is a simple and informative model, 
where the Arabic data of the main predicting factors are available, albeit with dubious 
qualities.    
 
The main challenges are that data on hours-worked for the Arab countries are 
not available, which makes assessment of the goodness of fit of the model difficult.  
And, some of the Arab countries, namely the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
(GCC) oil and gas producers are almost tax-free economies.  With the effective 
marginal tax rate close to zero, the model predicts a very high, nonsensical, labor 
supply.  
 
To deal with these challenges we fit the model to the G7 data and use that as a 
yardstick to assess the goodness of fit of the model to the Arab countries.  For the 
group of the oil-producing countries, we introduce natural resource endowment, into 
the model.  It turned out that the natural resource capital creates a wedge between real 
wages and the marginal product of labor similar to the tax or labor wedge.  The 
increase in the share of natural resource reduces hours-worked. It discourages work 
and reduces labor supply because rent-seeking activity increases with relatively high 
hydrocarbon revenues. 
 
The GCC countries are rent-economies, Noland and Pack (2007).  When 
hydrocarbon revenues as a percent of GDP increase because of the increase in energy 
prices, oil-rich governments run expansionary fiscal policies, and distribute rent in 
proportion to revenues.  Handouts of goodies take several different forms such as 
contracts, concessions to friendly domestic and foreign businesses and speculators, 
bureaucratic jobs and higher wages to citizens, most of them don't even show up for 
work.  On average, equilibrium hours-worked is expected to be lower in the state of 
the world, where hydrocarbon revenues are high.  And when energy prices drop, 
hydrocarbon revenues decline and the rent shrinks, which motivate households to 
work longer hours to compensate for the loss of income from rent, and to smooth 
consumption, hence a higher equilibrium hours-worked. These are the manifestations 
of the resource curse in the labor market.  For the resource curse see for example, 
Sachs and Warner (1997), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Caselli and Michaels (2009).  
 
We make a number of contributions.  First we compute hours-worked for five 
Arab non-oil producers (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) and for seven 
oil-producers (Algeria plus the Gulf Cooperating Council group – the GCC – of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of 
  2Saudi Arabia (KSA).  This allows us to compute and analyze the Frisch elasticity of 
the labor supply, which plays a major role in policy design.  And, also allows us to 
shed light on productivity in the Arab countries relative to the G7.  Second, we are 
unaware of any published article on the work – leisure model with a natural resource 
endowment.  We modify the model and show that such endowment works just like a 
tax on labor supply.  Third, we confirm the validity of the work-leisure intertemporal 
– intratemporal substitution model using Arab countries' data.  A theory is most valid 
if it fits different data at different times. So far, the bulk of the evidence for the work – 
leisure model relies on data from developed countries.  We show that Arab countries' 
labor supply curves are just like the G7, also elastic, which has important policy 
implications.
2  Non oil-producing Arab countries work long hours, but their relative 
productivities are low, thus they are relatively poorer.  Oil-producing countries work 
much less.   So the relatively less fortunate Arab countries work hard while the oil-
rich countries are hardly working, especially when oil revenues are high.   
 
Finally, we solve the model stochastically and produce baseline projections of 
future labor supply for the Arab countries.  Then we conduct policy scenarios.  First, 
for the GCC countries we ask how much is the change in welfare if the GCC countries 
embark on a diversification policy, which reduces the reliance on oil as the main 
source of income?  We find very significant increases in the lifetime consumption 
equivalent.  Second, we ask how much is the change in welfare due to the 
introduction of a permanent consumption tax?  Finally, how long it will take to 
eliminate poverty if a policy to reduce the tax rate on household is adopted in non oil-
producing countries?  We find that a small permanent tax cut can reduce poverty by 
more than half in about 12 years. 
  
The model is presented next. In section 3 we produce and discus the results. 
Section 4 includes policy simulations. Section 5 is a conclusion. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We begin with  the model found in Prescott (2004) to derive the labor supply.
3  
A similar model is presented in Nickell (2003) and Shimer (2009).   Then we modify 
the model to include natural resource endowment. 
 
The utility function of a stand in household who faces a work – leisure 
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The utility function depends on the expected discounted sum of consumption 
and leisure, where 100 is the number of hours available for individuals to work in a 
week and  is hours work in “market activities”. The expectations operator 
c
h E does not 
necessarily mean rational expectations, and 1 0 < < β is the discount factor specifies 
the degree of patience.  A high value means more patience for consumption and 
leisure.  The parameter α is  and denotes the value of the non-market productive 
time for household.  Maybe it is the relative value of the time spent in working at 
home.  Typically, it is the relative value of leisure. The production using this time is 
0 >
  3untaxed.   The utility function includes one consumption good as in Christaino and 
Eichenbaum (1992).   We find no contradiction of such assumption with reality in the 
Arab countries.   
 
The stock of capital evolves according to: 
 
t t t x k k + − = + ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 1 δ  
 
Where is the stock of capital and  is gross investments.  The depreciation rate is  k δ .  t x
 
There is a stand-in firm with a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale technology of 
production: 
 
θ θ − =
1 ) 3 ( t t it it h k A y t t t g x c + + ≥ , where  is government expenditures.  g
 
Total factor productivity is exogenous given by  , where iis country  . it A n i L , 2 , 1 =
4  
The parameter  1 0 < <θ is the share of capital.   
 
It is argued that the technical progress is exogenous because it plays no role in the 
inference being drawn.  
 
The household’s date   budget constraint is:  t
 
t t t t K t t h t x t c T k k r h w x c + + − − + − = + + + δ δ τ τ τ τ ) )( 1 ( . ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 4 ( 
 
Where  is the real wage,  w r is the real interest rate or rental capital, and T is 
transfer payment. The tax rates of consumption, investments, labor, and capital are 
given byτ with the subscripts c,  x,  ,  denote consumption, investments and 
capital respectively.  
h k
 
There is a literature on the methods of estimating average marginal income tax 
rates in the US, where differences seem significant.  Differences in the computation of 
income tax rates could affect the tax rateτ  in model. For more on the debate, see 
Barro (1979), Seater (1982), Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986), Stephenson (1998), 
and Akhand and Liu (2002).  
 
Prescott (2004) derives the tax rate in the model theoretically.  See appendix 2 
for details.  He derives an aggregate effective marginal tax rate on labor income using 
both the tax rate on consumption  c τ and on labor  h τ .  It is the fraction of additional 
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It is also important to note that the marginal and the average labor income 
taxes are very different.   All tax revenues, except for that used to finance the pure 
public consumption, is given back to households as lump-sum transfer payments 
  4(independent of the household's income).  Note that the model economy's 
consumption in the utility function above is  c mil IT G G C c − − + = , where G is public 
consumption and  is military spending.  And the model economy's output in the 
production function is 
mil G
IT GDP y − = .   
 
In the Arab countries, public consumption is large, and so is the subsidy.  In 
some Arab countries, only total amount of subsidy is reported, which is the sum of 
production and consumption goods subsidy. We had to make an assumption on 
splitting them.  The data appendix includes more information. 

















And from the production function, the marginal product of labor is equal to the 
real wage rate: 
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The subscript denote country and the subscript tdenotes time.  The parameters 
which do not have subscripts will be calculated as the average across the countries in 
the sample, and fixed throughout unless stated otherwise.   For example every country 
will have a fixed value of θ  in equation 8 equal to the average of θ  across the 
countries. The intertemporal substitution is captured by the ratio of consumption to 
GDP in equation 8.  The intratemporal substation is captured by the tax rate in 
equation 8.  If the effective tax rate on labor income is expected to be lower in the 
future, for example, people will increase their current consumption.  
 
2.1 Introducing natural resource endowment effect 
 
For the GCC countries and Algeria, the theory predicts that a low tax rate τ  
increases hours work.  If we fit the model for the GCC, hours-worked will be very 
high, higher than the US and Japan. To ameliorate this problem we modify the model 
by introducing oil endowment.   
 
Let the "effective" stock of capital be , and  , where mis an 
amplification factor, is natural resource capital and 
*
t k k N m kt ) (
* =
N K is the stock of capital.  We 
assume that  , where  is the stock reserves of both oil and gas. The 
production function becomes: 
θ ω
t t t k N k =
* N
 
  5θ ω θ ω − − =
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We call it  , where the superscript  refers to natural resources.  The share 
of hydrocarbon in output is
N h N
ω .  For ω >0 this formula predicts that  < in equation 
(8).  For 
N h h
ω =1,  <0 and for





The data are fully described in the appendix.  Note that our data are measured 
in PPP term so they are larger in magnitudes than actual data.  The data for the Arab 
countries have dubious quality.  One problem is missing data.  We use averages over 
the period 1999 to 2006 to calibrate the model, but for some countries the averages 
are for less than the full sample.  Consumption data are also dodgy. These are 
residuals of the equation of exchange or the income identity.  
 
Table 1 includes our estimates of hours-worked for the G7 for the period 2000 
to 2008.  The fit of the G7 is our yardstick for the goodness of fit of the model for the 
Arab countries because Arab countries do not report hours-worked. 
 
The countries are listed in the first column.  The second column reports actual 
hours-worked.  We fix the value of α , the relative value of leisure, to the average of 
the G7, and to get the best fit.  For our sampleα  is 1.78.  We also took the average 
share of capital θ  to be 0.38.  We computed the share of capital from National 
Income Accounts, as gross operating surplus / GDP ratio.  The predicted hours-
worked are reported in the third column. The fourth column reports the difference 
between the actual and the estimated values.  The model fits Canada, Italy, and Japan 
best; slightly over-predicting in the case of Canada, and slightly under-predicting in 
the cases of Italy and Japan.  On average, however, the fit is fine with a difference of 
0.06 only.  The G7 average weekly hours-worked per person is about 23. 
 
The fit can be made tighter when we allow α  to vary across countries.  We 
report the different values forα  in table 1.  Allowing α to vary across the G7 
countries shows that the Italy has a value of α right on the average of 1.78.  Three 
countries Canada, the UK, and the US have a value of α equal 1.6, which is below the 
G7 average.  The non-English speaking countries France, Germany and Japan have a 
value of α higher than 2.  The relative value of leisure is much higher in the non-
English speaking G7 countries. 
 
Now we can turn to estimating hours-worked for the Arab non-oil producing 
and labor abundant countries.  We compute the tax rate the same way we calculated 
them for the G7, and as we explained in the appendix.  Note that there are no time 
series data for the marginal tax rates for Arab countries. We also conduct a sensitivity 
  6analysis. The share of capital, θ is fixed to the average of the Arab countries at 0.48.  
For the Arab countries we try α  of 1.78.   
 
We have no actual data for the Arab countries, but the prediction of the model 
seems sensible.  The average weekly hours-worked per person is 19.87, which is 
lower from the G7 average of 23.4.  Beginning with most obvious, the Syrians work 
much more than all other countries (26.1hours) because they pay the lowest tax rate 
among Arabs and their average propensity to consume is less than average G7.   
Egypt's estimate of hours-worked is less than Jordan's even though the Jordanians 
have a higher tax rate than the Egyptians. This is because the consumption – output 
ratios are quite different. The Egyptians consumption to output ratio is 0.98 while 
Jordan is 0.79.  Egypt's consumption to output ratio exceeds the G7 average by far. 
All Arab non oil-producing countries have a high consumption to output ratio, far 
exceeding the developed countries in PPP terms. The North African nations, Tunisia 
and Morocco work less than the Syrians and the Jordanians because they pay 
relatively more taxes than other Arabs.  Morocco and Tunisia's average weekly hours 
– worked are approximately 17.   
 
The results in table 1 confirm the literature's findings that when people are 
taxed the same rate they, they most probably supply the same amount of labor, 
everything else is the same.  Taxes affects labor supply decision in the Arab countries.   
 
Our estimates of the Frisch elasticity in table 1 suggest that the labor supply 
curves for the Arab countries are elastic, more so in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.  
These Frisch elasticity estimates support the literature's.  Fairly elastic labor supplies 
spares countries the trouble of facing the cruel choice of either increasing taxes on the 
young, thereby reducing their welfare, or not honoring the promise made to the old 
making them worse off.  One thing large labor supply elasticity means is that as 
population age, promises of payment to the current and future old people cannot be 
financed by increasing taxes. 
 
Our estimates of the labor supply can explain why the non-oil producing Arab 
countries have low productivity.  There should be no problem with working less hours 
if efficiency and productivity are high.  However, this is not the case for the Arab 
countries.  Table 2 reports the decomposition of income per working age population 
relative to the average G7, GDP per working age population is decomposed to: GDP 
per hour and hours per working age population, i.e., labor productivity times labor 
utilization.  The Arabs do not seem to have a lot of problems with labor utilization.  
They work long hours, but their relative productivity level is significantly low.  The 
Arabs work hard, produce relatively less output per hour, and they are poorer than the 
G7.  Any increase in the tax rate in the Arab non-oil producing countries will make 
them even poorer.  
 
Now we turn to the oil-rich and labor-scarce Arab countries.  These include 
the GCC countries plus Algeria.  The GCC effective marginal tax rate is very low, 
about 5 percent compared to Algeria, which is 34 percent.   GCC countries have only 
social security tax of about 5 percent, no income tax and no consumption tax.  We 
estimate hours-worked over two samples.  The first sample is when the price of oil 
was low, hence oil revenues to GDP were low. The second sample is when the price 
of oil was high, hence the revenues to GDP were high.  The theory predicts that 
  7households will increase their supply of labor in periods of low oil revenues and low 
rent. 
 
The share of hydrocarbon in GDP ω is taken from the budgets.  It is basically 
the ratio of oil and gas revenues where the superscript 
denotes hydrocarbon (oil and gas), hence  is the price of the hydrocarbons and 
is the quantity.  And, the superscript  denotes the non-hydrocarbon. 
) /(




   
Results of the estimates of the GCC and Algeria are shown in table 3. For 
sensitivity analysis, we use values of α  1.3 and 1.5 and also 2.0.  The average 
predicted equilibrium weekly hours-worked in the GCC is between a high of 
approximately 20 hours and a low of 13, during the sample when oil revenues as a 
share of GDP were low, which is a sensible figure compared with previous estimates 
of the G7, and Arab non-oil producing countries.  This average is lower than the 
average of the non-oil producing Arab countries.  Algerians work slightly longer 
hours than the average GCC, but less than Bahrain.  Bahrain, Oman and the UAE 
predicted weekly hours-worked exceed the average GCC.  They also work harder than 
the average Arabs.  The citizens have higher labor participation rates and more 
involvements in the labor market than other GCC countries.  Bahrain and Oman in 
particular,  implement active labor market policies to reduce unemployment and get 
their citizens to work.  Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia work relatively less hours than 
all other Arab countries, whether oil or non-oil producing.  These three countries are 
major oil and gas producers. 
 
In the second sample over the period of high hydrocarbon revenues, hours-
worked plummet just like the theory predicts.  The average falls somewhere between 
7 and 5 hours.  Algeria's hours fall between 7 and 5 hours.  Among the GCC, Oman's 
hours-worked decline is the largest, between 12 and 8 hours.  On average, GCC 
hours-worked could decline by 5 to nearly 8 hours due to higher hydrocarbon 
revenues. That says a lot about the extent of the rent in these economies and reflects 
the manifestation of the oil curse in the labor market.   
 
We solve the model for the effective marginal tax rateτ  for the G7 and for 
ω in the GCC, i.e., the resource wedge .  Figure 1 plots the tax wedge for the G7 and 
the resource wedge for the GCC.  The averages over the sample 1991-2006 are 0.41 
and 0.36 for the GCC and the G7 respectively.  The natural resource wedge works the 
same way the tax wedge works: it increases the wedge between real wages and the 
marginal product of labor, and away from perfect competition in the labor market.   
 
To confirm that the estimates of labor supply are highly sensitive to the tax 
rate, we report estimates with different tax rates.  In Prescott (2004) the marginal tax 
rate  inc ss h t τ τ 6 . 1 + = , where  ss τ is social security tax and inc τ is the marginal income 
tax.  The number 1.6 reflects the fact that the marginal income tax rates are higher 
than the average tax rates, and the number delivers a marginal income tax found in 
Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for the "US". Their calculation of the marginal income 
tax is based on a representative sample of tax records.  They calculate by how much 
the tax revenue increases if every household labor income is increased by one percent.  
The total change in tax receipts divided by the total change in labor income is their 
estimate of the marginal income tax.  We play with this number, and recalibrate hours 
  8for values of 1, 1.6, 2.6, and 3.6.  We prefer the central estimates because we believe 
the estimates are neither very low nor very high. It is inconceivable that the tax rates 
are above 40 percent in the Arab countries (see appendix 2). 
 
Our paper does not include the effect of the population dynamics.  We know 
from various empirical evidence that demographics play a major role in the study of 
labor supply.  Noland and Pack (2007) provided demographic statistics for the Arab 
countries, which show that (1) population growth slowing down, (2) fertility rates 
falling, (3) median population age is projected to rise, (4) female labor force 
participation trending up and projected to reaching 60 percent in many Arab countries 
by 2020.  The supply of labor will be probably increase in the future.  
 
4. Policy simulations 
 
4.1 Diversification, consumption tax and Welfare in GCC 
 
We provide a baseline stochastic projections for hours-worked until 2050.   
Then we simulate policy scenarios. The first policy scenario is about the welfare 
effect of taxes.  We study the effect of a reduction in the share of oil in GDP in the 
GCC as a result of a policy that aims at diversifying income.   
 
We examine the effect of a permanent reduction in the share of hydrocarbon in 
GDP, ω  by an amount equal to 0.25 standard deviations.  We assume that the GCC 
countries have successfully managed to diversify their economies away from 
hydrocarbon by the year 2020, hence a permanent reduction in the share of oil and gas 
in GDP from the year 2021 to 2050 (the end of our simulation).   The share of oil and 
gas revenues as we stated earlier is  .  Diversification 
means a reduction in the value of 
) /(
no no o o o o q p q p q p + = ω
ω  coming through an increase in   (the non-
hydrocarbon output), thus higher share of labor in the production function and a lower 
share of natural resources.  The increase in labor supply increases output and 
consumption.   
no noq p
 
The welfare effect of the policy is measured by the lifetime consumption 
equivalent, which is the change in real consumption required to make the households 
indifferent to the policy.   
 
We solve the model numerically over the period 2004 to 2050 using stochastic 
simulation with 10000 iterations.
5  The parameters  2 = α ,  51 . 0 = θ , which is the 
average value of GCC over the sample 1991-2003, ω is assumed to be a random walk 
process over the forecasting period; the error term has a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation equal to the sample value.  To simplify the solution of the model further we 
appeal to the stochastic implications of the lifecycle – permanent income theory of 
consumption and assume that the conditional expectations of the future marginal 
utility of consumption follows a random walk (Hall, 1978).  Working age population 
grows at historical trend. The capital stock's starting value is assumed to be twice the 
size of real GDP in 1960.  The depreciation rate was assumed to be 0.05.  The value 
of the exogenous technical change Ain the production function is the constant term, 
and calibrated such that the value of output in 2004 is not far away from 2003 to make 
sure we have a sensible projection. 
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Baseline level of consumption is estimated to be increasing in all GCC 
countries, but leveling off in the far future.  The consumption to output ratio 
projection depends on the projected level of output from the production function.  In 
the baseline solution, Bahrain's ratio has a negative trend suggesting that output is 
projected to increase by more than consumption.  This ratio rises in Kuwait, Oman, 
and KSA.  The most significant positive trend is in KSA.  The ratio is constant in the 
UAE.   
 
The second policy simulation introduces a 5 percent permanent value added 
tax (consumption tax  c τ in the GCC on welfare, which translates to a 9.5% increase in 
the tax rateτ  (equation 5).   
 
The results of the two policy simulations are reported in table 4.  We report the 
averages of the share of hydrocarbon in GDPω ; the standard deviation ofω ; and the 
consumption to GDP ratio over the sample from 1991 to 2003. In the second panel, 
columns 5, 6 and 7 report the average projected hours-worked, the value of the share 
of hydrocarbon.  In the third panel, columns 7, 8, 9 and 10 we report the results of the 
first policy, policy I.  In column 10 we quantify the policy of a  ω σ 25 . 0 reduction, in 
US dollars.  And in the last three columns we report the results of the second policy.  
Note the jump in the labor supply under policy I.  The reduction in the hydrocarbon 
revenues is very small because we just wanted to show the welfare impact of a small 
change in policy.  The reduction is 0.1 on average and about 1.4 billion US dollars. 
This reduction in hydrocarbon revenues is matched by an equal reduction in 
government spending to keep the budget constraint unchanged.  We assume that the 
government can reshuffle the budget in any different way it likes.
6     
 
Table 5 reports the lifetime consumption equivalent of the two policies.   
Clearly, the welfare improvement which results from the diversification policy and 
measured in lifetime consumption equivalent is positive and sizable.  In the case of 
Oman, it is 14 percent, followed by Qatar 10.8 percent and Kuwait 9.3 percent.  The 
lowest is Saudi Arabia.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a relatively better 
diversified economy than other GCC countries.  The share of manufacturing and 
agriculture in GDP are reasonably high.  The World Bank Development Statistics 
reports Saudi Arabia's agriculture, manufacturing and services value added in the total 
GDP in 2008 to be 2.3, 8 and 27.2 percent.  
 
Bahrain, the smallest oil producer.  Bahrain main source of income is not oil.  
Its welfare improvement from the diversification policy is equal to that of Saudi 
Arabia.  In the UAE, the welfare improvement measured by lifetime consumption 
equivalent is 5 percent, the third lowest.  The share of agriculture, manufacturing and 
services value added in 2006 reported by the World Bank Development Statistics are 
2, 12.25 and 39.11 percent respectively.  Qatar, Kuwait and Oman benefit the most 
from diversification.  Qatar and Kuwait rely heavily on hydrocarbon revenues.  The 
Kuwaiti data are available from the same source for 2003 only.  The shares are 0.46, 
2.27, and 48.5 percents.  We do not have similar data for Qatar and Bahrain. 
 
For policy II, an introduction of a permanent  5 percent VAT reduces welfare 
by around 4.6 percent in terms of lifetime consumption equivalent.  The positive 
  10change in the labor supply resulting from the diversification policy is larger in 
magnitude than the negative change resulting from the tax policy.  One can only 
imagine a sizable welfare effect of a policy change larger than 0.25 standard deviation 
in hydrocarbon share in the economy.  The point is clear. Diversify and benefit. 
 
4.2 Tax policy, labor supply and poverty reduction  
 
Finally, we discuss the policy simulation pertinent to poverty reduction in the 
Arab countries.  A decrease in the tax rate or the effective marginal income tax rate 
would increase the supply of hours, GDP, and reduces poverty.  The policy simulation 
is intended to provide a feel for this policy recommendation.  We want to answer 
questions such as, how long would it take to reduce or eliminate poverty?   
 
We choose Morocco as a case study for poverty for two reasons.  Morocco's 
poverty level is high, 21 percent of the population. And because we have some data 
on income distribution. The poverty data are based on the World Bank data found in 
POVNET for the year 2007 only and the base year for real expenditures is 2005.  For 
this reason we use data for real consumption and output from the Penn Table 6.3, 
which has data up to 2007 for Morocco and the base year is 2005.  
 
We solve the model over the period 1991-2006, and simulate the model 
stochastically with 10000 iterations over the period 2008 to 2040.  In the baseline 
solution, τ  the effective marginal tax rate is equal 0.39.  We set α  to 1.78, which is 
the average we used earlier, and the share of capital θ  equal to 0.55 which is also the 
average over the sample.  Here too we guess that the capital stock's starting value is 
twice the size of real GDP in 1960.  The depreciation rate was assumed 0.05.   
Consumption is assumed to be a random walk, with a standard normal error term of a 
zero mean and standard deviation equal to the that of the sample average from 1991-
2007.  The value of the exogenous technical change Ain the production function is the 
constant term, and calibrated such that the value of output in 2008 is not far away 
from 2007 to make sure we have a sensible projection.  The policy reduces the tax rate 
to 0.30 permanently.   
 
The simulated values of real consumption is used to compute poverty 
headcount. There are three parameters in the poverty function: mean real consumption 
expenditures; Gini coefficient; and the poverty line. The poverty line is fixed at 72 US 
dollar per household per month in PPP term.  The Gini coefficient is fixed.  The only 
parameter that changes is mean real consumption expenditure, which is updated over 
the simulation period.   We report the results in table 6.  Figure 2 plots the poverty 
reduction dynamics. 
 
Clearly, poverty could be reduced significantly.  As income level rises and 
growth rate of real consumption rises poverty can be cut by more than half in 2020, 
i.e., in 12 years.  Poverty can be eliminated by 2050.  One can clearly advocate more 
tax reduction than the one we assumed, and cut poverty even faster and by more.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The work- leisure model of the labor supply has been tested extensively in the 
literature, and the majority of evidence seems to support its predictions.  This paper 
  11uses data from Arab countries to confirm the predictions of the model and add to the 
existing evidence yet another supporting evidence. The supply of labor is elastic. 
 
There are two types of Arab countries.  One consists of non oil-producing and 
labor abundant countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.  The 
other includes major oil-producing and labor-scarce countries such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).  Algeria is a major oil and gas and producer, but not a 
labor-scarce country.  While the model explains the data of the first group of Arab 
countries well, where results are comparable to the G7, the second group of Arab 
countries is more interesting because there are no taxes in the GCC countries.   
Without taxes the model's performance and predictions are of limited values. To 
ameliorate this deficiency we introduce natural resource endowment effect in the 
work-leisure model.  We define effective capital as the product of physical capital and 
natural resource capital.  We found that natural resources endowment acts like a tax, 
i.e., reduces labor supply. 
 
The theory we had in mind is consistent with the resource curse story.  Oil rich 
GCC countries rely heavily on their natural resources as income.  The government 
budget swells during periods of high hydrocarbon (oil and gas) prices, which beget 
rent-seeking behavior.  People spend the time looking for goodies, gifts, contracts, 
wage subsidy…etc and eventually labor supply declines.  The opposite happens when 
hydrocarbon revenues decline and the budgets shrink.  People are forced to work 
longer hours to compensate for the loss in rent, and smooth out consumption.  We 
show that the data support such theory over periods of actual high and low 
hydrocarbon revenues. The supply of labor could decline by up to 7 hours a week per 
person during periods of high oil revenues.    
 
The Arab countries labor supplies are very elastic, more so in the oil-
producing countries.  An elastic labor supply could imply less interventionist 
government policies.  And as population age, transfer payments to current and future 
old generation need not be financed by increasing tax rates. It can open doors to social 
security policies that encourage savings, Prescott (2004).  Elastic labor supplies are 
also good for demand policies that aims at increasing employment and hours.  
 
We simulate the model for scenarios under a minimum number of additional 
assumptions.   We demonstrate that a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate in 
the Arab countries can reduce poverty substantially, cut it in half in about 12 years in 
the case of Morocco.   
 
High taxes, even a 5 percent increase in the value added tax (VAT) in the oil-
rich countries would reduce welfare in terms of the lifetime consumption equivalent.  
But most importantly we show that the resource rich countries increase welfare 
significantly from a decline in oil revenues.   To change the natural resource curse to a 
blessing the GCC is strongly advised to diversify its income away from oil while it 
can. Our model and simple assumption indicate that a permanent reduction of 
hydrocarbon in the year 2020 could increase labor supply, real GDP and consumption 








(1) Prescott (2004) provide evidence that – everything else constant – significant 
differences in international hours-worked almost disappear when tax rates are similar. 
Scandinavians pay relatively more taxes.  Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007) argued 
that Scandinavian governments subsidize market inputs into home production and 
provide more transfers (e.g. subsidized daycare) to households that supply more labor. 
Olovsson (2009) use home production data to account for the differences in hours-
worked between Scandinavians and others.   
 
(2) Lucas and Rapping (1969), Hall (1980), Andrew and Nickell (1982), Alogoskoufis 
(1987a, 1987b), Dutkowsky and Dunsky (1996), Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004), and 
Shimer (2009) among many others provided evidence that support the model.  Card 
(1991) cited a number of surveys at the micro level, which seem to suggest that the 
intertemporal substitution proposition offers little explanation to labor supply 
decisions. Heckman (1993) cited more supportive evidence. The literature is 
voluminous, but most cited work evidence against the intertemporal substitution 
model are, Altonji (1982), Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) 
 
(3) Prescott cites a number of papers as the basis of this theory; business cycle 
literature Cooley (1995) and Cooley and Ohanian (1999); in the depression literature 
he cites Kehoe and Prescott (2002); in public finance, Christaino and Eichenbaum 
(1992), Baxter and King (1993); and in the stock market literature McGrattan and 
Prescott (2003) and Boldrin, Christian and Fisher (2001).  The labor supply is 
consistent with Lucas and Rapping (1969), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott 
(1982), Hansen (1985) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
 
(4) It is hard to imagine a process for in the Arab countries.
4  The stock of R&D 
stock and patents registered in the US are very low.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE combined registered 367 patents in the US during the 
period from 1980 to 2000. Compare that to Korea which registered 6328 patents.  
Human capital stock and the quality of the human capital are questionable, see 
Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A Human Development Approach, UN 
(2009).   
 
(5) When solving, an approximated Jacobian is used when linearizing the model.  Then 
the approximation is updated each iteration by comparing the residuals, which result 
from the new trial value of the endogenous variables with the residuals of the linear 
equation. The method is not significantly different from Newton, but it runs faster. 
The innovations to stochastic equations are generated by drawing a set of random 
numbers from a standard normal distribution each period.  These draws are scaled to 
match the variance-covariance system by multiplying the vector by its standard 
deviation because the covariance matrix is diagonal.   
 
(6) The Penn table 6.2 data are only available to the year 2003 for the GCC countries. 
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  17Table 1:Actual and Predicted Labor Supply for the G7  
and Arab non-oil Producing Countries  
) 1 / )( / ( ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( τ α θ θ − + − − = y c h  
 
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the G7 (2000-2008)
 
Country  Actual    h Predicted




Canada  25.26  23.60  1.66  1.78 0.38 0.38  0.70 
France  20.08  22.73  -2.65  1.78 0.38 0.37  0.75 
Germany  19.33  21.88  -2.54  1.78 0.38 0.42  0.73 
Italy  21.09  22.45  -1.36  1.78 0.38 0.40  0.72 
Japan  26.98  28.40  -1.41  1.78 0.38 0.25  0.66 
UK  24.05  21.30  2.75  1.78 0.38 0.38  0.80 
US  26.06  23.71  2.35  1.78 0.38 0.30  0.79 
Average  G7  23.26  23.20  0.06  1.78  0.38  0.35  0.73 
 
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the Arab Countries (1999-2006) 
  Actual  Predicted 
 
Frisch 
Elasticity  α   θ   τ   y c/  
Egypt  NA 18.47  4.4  1.78  0.48  0.24 0.98 
Jordon  NA 21.03  3.8  1.78  0.48  0.28 0.79 
Morocco  NA 16.68  5.0  1.78  0.48  0.39 0.89 
Syria  NA 26.10  2.8  1.78  0.48  0.19 0.67 
Tunisia   NA 17.11  4.8  1.78  0.48  0.35 0.92 
Average  NA 19.87  4.1  1.78  0.48  0.28 0.85 
 
1.  Both α and  θ are the average values across G7 countries.  The individual values of α for G7 
which minimizes the error are 1.6 (Canada), 2.2 (France), 2.1 (Germany), 1.7 (Italy), 2.1 (Japan), 1.6 
(UK) and 1.6 (USA) respectively.   Same average value of α  is adopted for the Arab countries.  
 
 
Table 2: Productivity Decomposition of Arab Non-Oil Producing  
Countries Relative to Average G7 – Sample 1999 to 2006 
 
Hours are based on a value of 78 . 1 = α  
 
Country  GDP per Person  GDP per Hour  Hours per 
Person 
Egypt  15.80 21.48 73.55 
Jordan  12.73 15.17 83.89 
Morocco  15.90 23.97 66.32 
Syria 6.21  5.94  104.6 
Tunisia  22.06 32.43 68.03 




  18Table 3: Labor Supply with Natural Resource Endowment for Oil Producing Countries 
  )] 1 / )( / ( ) 1 /[( ) 1 ( ˆ τ α ω θ ω θ − + − − − − = y c h
N
( 29 . 1 = α ) 
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period  High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
  N h ˆ  
Frisc
h  τ   y c/   θ   ω   N h ˆ   Frisch  τ   y c/
  θ   ω   Difference 
in hours 
Algeria 20.4  3.9  0.34  0.73  0.47  0.19  13.2 6.6  0.38  0.61  0.55  0.27  -12.6 
                       
Bahrain 25.8 2.9  0.05  0.73  0.49  0.19  18.8 4.3  0.05  0.72  0.53  0.26 -7.0 
Kuwait 12.8  6.8  0.05  0.81  0.49  0.36  7.2 12.8  0.05  0.71  0.53  0.40 -5.6 
Oman 21.7  3.6  0.05  0.83  0.49  0.22  9.8  9.2  0.05  0.73  0.53  0.37  -11.9 
Qatar 15.4  5.5  0.05  0.78  0.49  0.33  13.1  6.6  0.05  0.42  0.53  0.39  -2.30 
KSA 16.9  4.9  0.05  0.74  0.49  0.32  7.9  11.7  0.05  0.65  0.53  0.40  -9.0 
UAE 26.0  2.8  0.05  0.63  0.49  0.23  19.6  4.1  0.05  0.65  0.53  0.27  -6.4 
Average 19.8 4.43  0.05  0.75 0.49  0.29  12.72 8.14  0.05  0.65  0.53  0.35  -7.83 
) 55 . 1 ( = α  
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period  High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
  N h ˆ   Frisch  τ   y c/
  θ   ω   N h ˆ   Frisch  τ   y c/
  θ   ω   Difference 
in hours 
Algeria  16.5  5.0  0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19  10.6  8.5  0.38 0.61 0.55  0.27  -5.9 
                    
Bahrain  21.2  3.7  0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19  15.2  5.6  0.05 0.72 0.53  0.26  -6.0 
Kuwait  10.2  8.8  0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36  5.7  16.5 0.05 0.71 0.53  0.40  -4.5 
Oman  17.6  4.7  0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22  7.7  11.9 0.05 0.73 0.53  0.37  -9.9 
Qatar  12.4  7.1  0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33  10.5  8.6  0.05 0.42 0.53  0.39  -1.9 
KSA    13.6  6.4  0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32  6.2  15.2 0.05 0.65 0.53  0.40  -7.4 
UAE  21.4  3.7  0.05 0.63 0.49 0.33  15.9  5.3  0.05 0.65 0.53  0.27  -5.5 
Average 16.07  5.72 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 10.19 10.51 0.05 0.65 0.53  0.35  -5.0 
) 2 ( = α  
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period  High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
  N h ˆ  
Frisc
h 
τ   y c/
 
θ   ω   N h ˆ  
Frisch  τ   y c/   θ   ω   Difference 
in hours 
Algeria  13.3  6.5  0.34 0.73 0.47  0.19 8.40 10.9  0.38  0.61 0.55 0.27  -4.9 
                   
Bahrain 17.2 4.8 0.05  0.73  0.49 0.19  12.2
0 
7.2 0.05 0.72  0.53  0.26  -5.0 
Kuwait  8.1  11.4 0.05 0.81 0.49  0.36 4.50 21.4  0.05  0.71 0.53 0.40  -3.6 
Oman  14.2  6.0  0.05 0.83 0.49  0.22 6.10 15.4  0.05  0.73 0.53 0.37  -8.1 
Qatar  9.9  9.1  0.05 0.78 0.49  0.33 8.30 11.1  0.05  0.42 0.53 0.39  -1.6 
KSA  10.9  8.2  0.05 0.74 0.49  0.32 4.90 19.5  0.05  0.65 0.53 0.40  -6.0 
UAE 17.4  4.7  0.05  0.63  0.49  0.23  12.8  6.8  0.05  0.65  0.53  0.27  -4.4 
Average 12.96 7.38  0.05  0.75  0.49  0.29  8.11 13.56  0.05  0.65  0.53  0.35  -4.8 
θ is the share of capital. τ is the effective marginal tax rate;  is consumption to GDP ratio;  is 
equilibrium hours-worked predicted by the model; and 
y c/
N h ˆ
ω is the share of hydrocarbon revenues in GDP. 
 
 
  19Table 4: Taxes, Natural Resources and Labor Supply Projections for GCC 
Average values 
 





(2020 – 2050) 
Policy II 
(2004 – 2050) 
 
ω  
ω σ 25 . 0 
in million 
USD 
y c/ N h     y c/ N h     ω σ   ω   ω   τ   ω  
N h   τ  
Bahrain  0.22 0.04 72.5 16.4 0.25  71.0  17.1 0.24  153.3  0.05 15.7 0.25 0.095 
Kuwait  0.38 0.07 83.7 11.4 0.35  64.3  12.5 0.33  1017.2  0.05 10.9 0.35 0.095 
Oman  0.26  0.07  79.5 7.4 0.39 73.3  8.8 0.37  839.8  0.05 7.0 0.39 0.095 
Qatar  0.37 0.07 65.7 13.4 0.36  39.2  14.8 0.35  351.7  0.05 12.8 0.36 0.095 
KSA  0.32 0.04 70.7 16.2 0.29  60.4  17.0 0.28  3812.9  0.05 15.6 0.29 0.095 
UAE  0.30 0.07 63.5 18.7 0.23  66.1  19.9 0.21  2187.5  0.05 18.0 0.23 0.095 
GCC  0.31 0.06 72.6 13.9 0.31 62.38 15.0 0.30  1393.7  0.05 13.6 0.31 0.095 
 
N
t h is hours-worked (equation 10). 
ω  is the share of oil and gas (gas is converted into oil using the standard scale of 6.6). 
ω σ is the standard deviation of the natural resource revenues in GDP. 
y c/ is the consumption to GDP ratio. 
τ  is the tax rate. 
Consumption and ω follow a random walk process over the simulation horizon from 2004 to 2050. 
Policy I is the diversification policy, where the GCC manages to diversify by 2020, and reduce the share of hydrocarbon by 0.25 ω σ . 
Policy II is a tax rate increase policy, where a 5% permanent increase in VAT (9.5 percent in the tax rate in equation 5). 
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Country  Policy I  Policy II 
Bahrain 3.87  -  4.79 
Kuwait 9.29  -  4.80 
Oman 13.99  -  3.77 
Qatar 10.88  -  4.78 
KSA 4.21  -  4.81 
UAE 5.07  -  4.82 
 
-Policy I is the diversification policy, where the share of 
hydrocarbon in GDP falls by 0.25 standard deviation from 2021 to 
2050. 
-Policy II is an introduction of a 5 percent permanent increase in 




Table 6: Morocco's Poverty Reduction Policy Simulation 
 
 





t c Δ   Poverty % 
2007 Baseline Policy  Baseline  Policy        21.59 
i 
2008 15.99 17.97 5682.52 6014.69  -1.27  5.85  2.26  20.48 
2010 15.96 17.94 5905.58 6280.19  -1.15  6.34  2.58  18.27 
2015 15.97 17.95 6487.00 6967.58  -0.94  7.41  1.69  14.72 
2020 15.92 17.90 7076.94 7662.59  -0.81  8.28  1.20  10.50 
2025 15.93 17.91 7703.77 8395.41  -0.72  8.98  2.68  7.57 
2030 15.92 17.90 8356.12 9154.61  -0.66  9.56  1.51  5.61 
2035 15.93 17.91 9042.68 9949.86  -0.62  10.03  1.74  4.01 
2040 15.94 17.92 9767.29 10785.58  -0.58  10.43  1.37  2.92 
2045 15.93 17.91  10527.96  11659.88  -0.56  10.75  1.31  2.11 
2050 15.92 17.90  11328.41  12577.27  -0.53  11.02  1.46  1.54 
 
i Actual data 
-Data are in PPP 2005 base year.  Real PPP GDP. 
- τ d y/ ∂  is the tax multiplier, where an increase in the tax rate reduces income. 
-  is the GDP multiplier, where the superscript  denotes simulation 
solution  
100 ) / (
b b s y y y − s
value and bdenotes the baseline simulation value. 
-  is the consumption growth after policy. 
s
t c Δ

































































































  22Appendix 1 – Data  
Average 2000-2008  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  UK  USA 
General government final consumption expenditure, %GDP  19.24  23.31 18.70 19.62 17.86 20.54 15.58 
Consumption of fixed capital, % GDP  13.01  13.00 14.89 15.28 20.62 11.26 11.85 
Household final consumption expenditure, % GDP  55.84  56.46 58.47 59.04 57.08 64.88 70.03 
Working Age Popualtion to Total Population 0.69  0.63 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66  0.67 
Employment to Age working population  0.72  0.65  0.67  0.58  0.75  0.71  0.72 
Taxes  individuals, % GDP  12.23  7.64  8.91  10.72  5.19  10.48  10.38 
Social Security Contributions, Employees % GDP  2.01  4.02  6.11  2.30  4.28  2.64  3.00 
Taxes on goods and services, % GDP  8.42  11.00  10.35  11.01  5.22  10.97  4.73 
Military Expenditure, % GDP  1.20  2.46  1.38  1.92  0.97  2.46  3.76 
c τ   0.16  0.22 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.07 
ss τ   0.04  0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Capital  Share  0.38  0.35 0.38 0.46 0.35 0.34 0.37 
inc τ   0.16  0.10 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.12 
h τ   0.28  0.23 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.25 
τ   0.38  0.37 0.42 0.40 0.25 0.38 0.30 
y c/   0.70  0.75 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.80 0.79 
GDP Per Person, GDP Less IT in PPP 2005 divided By 
Population aged 15-64  42510.72  38698.09 37867.03 35733.27 40045.97 39364.55 57049.32 
 
   S o u r c e :   O E C D    































Algeria   0.51  0.69  12.67  29.79 10.46  8.01  60.14  0.44 
Bahrain   0.35  0.73  9.89  0.63  0.29  0.27  68.50  0.64 
Egypt   0.45  0.96  5.41  64.91  19.24 17.35 58.89  0.45 
Kuwait   0.57  0.84  10.67 2.05  1.08  1.09  70.99  0.74 
Jordan   0.36  0.77 14.39 4.60  1.23  1.21  68.35  0.38 
Morocco   0.56 0.90  11.52 27.76  9.56  8.55  60.67  0.51 
Oman   0.53  0.80  9.30 2.29  0.82  0.76  59.81  0.55 
Qatar   0.50  0.66 18.70  0.61 0.34  0.33  73.49  0.72 
KSA   0.51  0.71 9.96  20.06  6.64  6.34  58.67  0.54 
Syria   0.33  0.73 7.79  16.06 4.73  5.09  55.11  0.57 
Tunisia   0.24  0.92  13.35 9.33  3.09  2.71  62.78  0.46 
UAE   0.61  0.63 23.12  3.04 1.75  1.72  73.98  0.75 


















c τ   ss τ   inc τ   τ ss inc τ τ +    
ω Share of 
Hydrocarbon 
Revenues 
Algeria  0.27  38.0 4826.0 0.18  0.05  0.10  0.21 0.33 0.23 
Bahrain  0.44  0.8 15562.4 0.00  0.04  0.01  0.05 0.05 0.22 
Egypt  0.27 11.5  3955.0  0.09 0.05  0.08  0.17  0.24   
Kuwait  0.53  107.7  21698.5 0.00  0.04  0.00  0.04 0.04 0.32 
Jordan  0.26   3835.6  0.16  0.04  0.08  0.16  0.28   
Morocco  0.31   3630.0  0.19  0.10  0.11  0.28  0.39   
Oman  0.33  9.7 13127.0 0.00  0.04  0.01  0.05 0.05 0.20 
Qatar  0.53  113.6  23284.6 0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03 0.03 0.35 
KSA  0.31  302.4  14086.7 0.00  0.06  0.00  0.04 0.04 0.25 
Syria  0.31  4.3  1799.0 0.00  0.00  0.12  0.20 0.19 0.06 
Tunisia  0.29  0.4  6296.2 0.22  0.05  0.08  0.16 0.31 0.04 
UAE  0.56  137.8  24455.5 0.00  0.04  0.00  0.02 0.01 0.26 
Source  ILO  BP  PWT  WDI, IFS  SS  WDI, 
IFS  Computed  Computed  WDI, IFS 
 
ILO is the International Labor Organization 
BP is British Petroleum 
PWT is Penn World Table 6.3 
WDI is World Bank 
IFS is International Financial Stats, the IMF  
 Appendix 2 – Calculating the tax rate 
 
Prescott (2004) adjusts the National Income Account to fit with economics 
theory, where households pay the taxes.  The major adjustment is to treat "indirect 
taxes less subsidy" as "net taxes on final product". It means "net indirect tax" is not a 
cost component of GDP.  Indirect taxes include value-added taxes, sales taxes, excise 
taxes, property taxes…etc, which mostly levied on households.   Some indirect taxes 
such as diesel fuel taxes, property taxes on office buildings and sales taxes on 
equipments…etc fall on all forms of products.  It is assumed that 2/3 of the indirect 
taxes less subsidy fall directly on private consumption expenditures, and the 
remaining 1/3 is distributed evenly over private consumption and private investment.  
The net indirect taxes on consumption, is  IT
I C
C
ITc ] 3 / 1 3 / 2 [
+
+ = , where is 
private consumption expenditures,
C
I is private investment, and  is net indirect taxes.   
Consumption is 
IT
c mil IT G G C c − − + = , where  is public consumption and  is 
military spending.  The GDP is given by 
G mil G
IT GDP y − = . Prescott (2004) estimate of 






= τ . Regarding tax on labor income, Prescott (2004) 
has two: the income tax with a marginal tax rate inc τ (which we argued earlier in the 
paper that its estimation is highly controversial), and a social security tax.  The social 
security marginal tax rate 







τ  , where the denominator is labor 
income if labor is paid its marginal productivity.  The average income tax rate is 
on Depreciati IT GDP
Taxes Direct
inc − −
= τ , where direct taxes are paid by households and do 
not include corporate income taxes. Prescott's estimate of the marginal labor income 
tax  inc ss h t τ τ 6 . 1 + =   and the magic number 1.6 reflects the fact that the marginal 
income tax rates are higher than the average tax rates, and the number delivers a 
marginal income tax found in Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for the "US". Their 
calculation of the marginal income tax is based on a representative sample of tax 
records.  They  calculate by how much the tax revenue increases if every household 
labor income is increased by one percent.  The total change in tax receipts divided by 
the total change in labor income is their estimate of the marginal income tax.
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 Lower  Bound 
Estimate 
  Central Estimate    Upper Bound Estimate 
Country  1 τ   h    2 τ   h    3 τ   h    4 τ   h 
Algeria 0.28 17.8    0.33  16.8    0.41  15.1    0.50  13.1 
Egypt 0.20  21.5    0.24  20.6    0.31  19.1    0.38  17.5 
Jordan 0.24  24.4    0.28  23.4    0.34  21.9    0.41  20.0 
Morocco 0.34  19.9   0.39  18.6   0.49 16.1   0.58 13.7 
Syria 0.12  30.6    0.19  28.8    0.32  25.4    0.44  21.9 
Tunisia 0.30 20.3    0.35  19.2    0.43  17.2    0.51  15.1 
Average 0.24  22.4   0.28  21.3    0.44 19.1   0.45 16.8 
 
1 τ corresponds to a tax rate with inc ss h t τ τ 1 + =  
2 τ corresponds to a tax rate with inc ss h t τ τ 6 . 1 + =   
3 τ corresponds to a tax rate with inc ss h t τ τ 6 . 2 + =  
4 τ corresponds to a tax rate with inc ss h t τ τ 6 . 3 + =   
See definitions of the social security tax and tax on income in the appendix. ss τ inc τ  
h )] 1 / ( * ) / ( ) 1 /[( ) 1 ( τ α θ θ − + − − = y c are hours-worked using predicting factors 
48 . 0 = θ ;  
average Arab countries  and  y c/ 55 . 1 = α  
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